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Italy’s	endgame	and	the	future	of	the	Eurozone
Italy	has	been	one	of	the	hardest	hit	countries	in	the	world	during	the	Covid-19	outbreak	and	there	are
significant	concerns	about	the	impact	the	pandemic	will	have	on	the	Italian	economy.	Roberto	Orsi
writes	that	the	Eurozone	is	rapidly	heading	toward	a	point	where	it	will	either	have	to	adopt	radical	new
measures	to	accommodate	countries	like	Italy	or	risk	seeing	the	currency	bloc	break	apart.
The	Covid-19	pandemic	is	accelerating	Italy’s	slide	towards	its	economic	and	financial	endgame.
While	before	the	pandemic	the	country	already	found	itself	in	a	precarious	balance	between	high	debt	and	no
growth,	this	shock	is	precipitating	the	situation	by	bursting	the	various	arrangements	and	tactics	that	both	Rome
and	Brussels/Frankfurt	were	employing	to	create	a	screen	of	credibility	and	creditworthiness.	The	discussion	about
the	future	of	the	Eurozone	(whether	there	is	one,	for	whom,	and	how)	is	back	again.
A	new	economic	environment
The	pandemic	is	still	in	its	growing	stage	as	this	piece	is	being	written,	yet	it	is	already	clear	that	it	is	going	to	be	a
crisis	of	historical	dimensions.	It	will	not	be	over	by	the	end	of	April	or	May	2020.	This	means	the	world	economy
will	be	virtually	brought	to	a	standstill	for	a	whole	quarter.	Afterwards,	even	if	a	recovery	will	surely	take	place,	and
barring	a	second	wave	of	contagion	later	on,	any	return	to	normality	will	be	complicated	and	relatively	slow-paced.
It	is	difficult	to	estimate	the	death	toll	of	such	a	pandemic	and	the	scale	of	human	suffering	deriving	directly	or
indirectly	from	the	disease,	and	even	more	so	the	economic	and	social	costs,	but,	judging	by	the	unprecedented
steps	taken	in	all	developed	countries	to	prop	up	the	economy,	the	economic	and	financial	burden	will	be	colossal.
States	will	have	to	borrow	enormous	sums	in	order	to	avoid	financial	collapse,	thus	expanding	national	debt	by	a
large	margin.	In	the	2008-2009	crisis,	national	debts	ballooned	by	30%	to	50%	of	GDP	or	more,	depending	on	the
country,	in	a	few	years.	It	appears	that	this	crisis	will	require	a	much	larger	effort.	How	much	larger,	nobody	knows
yet,	as	it	will	depend	on	the	duration	of	the	pandemic.	Still,	it	can	be	expected	that	major	economies	will	shrink	by	8-
10%	in	2020,	with	Goldman	Sachs	forecasting	-9%	in	Q1	and	-34%	in	Q2	for	the	United	States.
National	debt	expansion	as	the	way	forward?
Former	ECB	Governor	Mario	Draghi	has	argued	in	a	recent	piece	in	the	Financial	Times	that	high	sovereign
debt/GDP	ratios	will	become	the	norm,	at	least	for	a	while.	He	is	certainly	correct	about	this,	but	the	quality	of	the
debt	and	the	underlying	national	economies	are	not	the	same	for	all,	and	markets	know	it.
The	stakes	are	very	clear:	there	are	some	countries,	most	notably	Italy,	which	cannot	expand	their	euro-
denominated	debt	by	30%	or	40%	of	their	rapidly	shrinking	GDP,	without	explicit	or	implicit	EU	guarantees	for	the
creditors.	Without	such	a	European	guarantee,	markets	will	not	allow	interest	rates	on	Italy’s	debt	to	remain
extremely	low,	a	requirement	to	keep	interest	payments	at	an	acceptable	level.
Alternatively,	the	creditors	will	mostly	become	the	ECB	system	or	the	Italian	banks,	or	both,	(this	has	already	been
happening	for	a	number	of	years).	Italy,	a	country	which	has	not	even	recovered	its	pre-2008	GDP,	can	hardly	be
expected	to	repay	any	more	national	debt	under	the	same	system	of	Eurozone	rules	which	have	been	in	place	up
to	now,	even	with	the	significant	formal	and	informal	amendments	and	innovative	practices	of	the	Draghi	era.
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Italy’s	Prime	Minister,	Giuseppe	Conte,	at	a	European	Council	meeting	in	February	2020,	Credit:	European	Union
Currently,	the	approach	to	the	crisis	is	the	following:	EU	limits	to	budget	deficits	are	lifted,	at	least	for	2020,	and	the
national	governments	can	spend	as	much	as	necessary,	issuing	new	national	debt;	the	ECB	will	provide	the
liquidity	to	buy	this	through	the	banks,	or	directly;	the	ECB	will	keep	interest	rates	as	low	as	possible	to	minimise
interest	payments;	later	on,	in	the	next	few	years,	the	debt	burden	will	have	to	be	reduced	by	growing	the	economy
and/or	repaying	the	debt,	and	budget	deficit	restrictions	will	be	reinstated.
However,	with	the	massive	debt	issuing	that	is	now	looming,	who	will	support	Italy	when	the	debt/GDP	ratio	climbs
from	135%	in	2019	to	170%?	To	180%?	Those	are	the	levels	which	triggered	the	debt	crisis	in	Greece	after	2010.
Who	believes	that	Italy	will	grow	at	an	accelerated	pace	in	the	next	decade?	On	the	basis	of	what	considerations?	It
appears	therefore	that	the	above-described	public	finance	approach	to	this	crisis	will	not	work	for	Italy.	The
country’s	leadership	knows	it,	and	they	are	looking	for	a	different	path.
Solidarity	and	the	Eurozone’s	architecture
The	most	straightforward	way	to	stabilise	Italy’s	financial	future	revolves	around	the	thorny	question	of	the
Eurozone’s	mutual	solidarity,	its	conditions	and	its	limits.	To	understand	this,	one	needs	to	go	back	to	the	question
of	the	Eurozone’s	fundamental	architecture	and	ethos.	If	the	national	debts	were	pooled	or	shared	in	some	way,	or
monetised	by	the	ECB,	part	of	Italy’s	debt	would	be	paid,	in	the	long	run,	also	by	other	euro	members’	taxpayers,
and	such	a	European	formal	guarantee	would	reassure	the	markets,	provided	that	Europe	as	a	whole	remains	a
credible	debtor.
Debt	pooling,	whatever	the	financial	arrangement,	would	require	the	overhaul	of	the	Eurozone	as	it	was	initially
conceived,	to	make	it,	by	necessity,	something	that	many	within	Europe,	both	governments	and	citizens,	do	not
want.	The	Eurozone	was	supposed	to	be	an	exclusive	club	of	high-performance	economies,	run	with	strict	rules
mirroring	the	best	practices	of	the	Bundesbank,	and	the	fiscal	restraint	of	northern	European	economies.	The	euro
was	supposed	to	make	every	economy	more	efficient	internally	and	more	competitive	externally,	by	inducing
structural	changes	to	be	managed	by	national	governments	under	the	supervision	of	EU	authorities,	with	the	goal	of
an	increasing	convergence	in	governance	standards	and	results.	Still,	the	underlying	political	agreement	in	the
Maastricht	Treaty	called	for	a	separation	of	national	budgets,	and	the	ultimate	national	responsibility	for	sovereign
debt.
Instead,	the	results	after	two	decades,	whether	or	not	caused	by	the	euro,	appear	to	be:	1)	a	persistent,	even
increasing	divergence	in	the	public	finance	performance	in	the	North	and	in	the	South	of	the	continent;	2)	a
perceived	stagnation	and/or	worsening	of	living	standards	in	numerous	parts	of	the	continent;	3)	increased	political
pressure	on	the	EU	and	the	Eurozone	project	calling	for	radical	reforms,	going	either	towards	debt	pooling
(sometimes	unconditional),	or	towards	the	dismantling	of	the	Eurozone/exit	of	single	countries.
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Whichever	way	one	may	look	at	it,	it	appears	that	the	original	project	and	architecture	of	the	Eurozone	is	no	longer
tenable,	if	all	members	are	to	remain	within	it.	The	Eurozone	as	a	single	currency	bloc	may	perhaps	be	able	to
survive	in	some	form,	but	in	order	to	do	so,	it	must,	at	least	temporarily	(but	still,	for	a	long	time,	possibly	decades):
a)	embrace	the	idea	that	it	has	failed	to	be	the	above-mentioned	exclusive	club	of	well-functioning	economies;	b)
consider	the	Stability	and	Growth	Pact	as	overhauled	and	no	longer	applicable;	c)	agree	on	a	new	identity	and
mission;	d)	agree	on	a	new	legal	and	political	structure,	one	which	goes	beyond	the	concept	of	separation	of
national	budgets.
The	last	point	is	the	most	difficult	one.	In	principle,	debt	pooling	could	be	agreed	if	there	were	a	shared	vision	of
what	to	do	in	the	future	in	terms	of	macroeconomic	and	fiscal	policies,	and	if	there	were	enough	chance	of	success.
Such	chances	are	not	visible	to	most	people.	Besides,	there	is	no	clear	political	vision	for	further	integration	of	EU
or	Eurozone	members,	as	it	is	rather	unavoidable,	out	of	political	and	organisational	considerations,	that	debt
pooling	would	require	a	harmonised	fiscal	policy,	and	hence	some	sort	of	political	union.
There	could	be	partial	forms	of	pooling,	for	instance	for	bonds	related	to	particular	kinds	of	investments	(but	who
controls	how	the	money	will	be	spent?	how	can	rules	be	enforced?),	or	bonds	issued	by	a	group	of	Eurozone
members,	but	not	all,	for	instance	a	“southern	alliance”	with	France	at	the	helm.	On	the	other	hand,	numerous
political	leaders	in	the	North	have	already	expressed	rather	clearly	the	view	that	they	wish	to	keep	the	ultimate
separation	of	national	budgets	as	a	non-negotiable	element	of	the	Eurozone.
North	vs.	South?
Many	in	Italy	regard	resistance	against	debt	pooling	as	a	want	of	European	solidarity,	and	a	failure	to	live	up	to	the
political	and	ethical	commitment	from	other	EU	members.	However,	should	EU	solidarity	be	unconditional?	While	it
is	certainly	good	to	show	solidarity	at	a	time	of	acute	distress	(as	is	happening	now),	infinite	and	unconditional
solidarity	is	ethically	wrong.	Once	the	emergency	is	over,	it	is	not	unfair	to	ask	every	country	to	return	to	a	path	of
economic	and	financial	sustainability.	Is	financial	sustainability	not	the	norm	of	every	state	budget,	or	even	every
household?
The	possible	existence	of	areas	of	the	Eurozone	permanently	depending	on	transfers	from	other	regions	would	be
unfair	and	it	would	certainly	generate,	as	is	already	happening,	fierce	political	resistance.	Solidarity	should	always
be	conditional	in	the	long	run.	Italy	is	right	in	demanding	solidarity	(it	will	get	it	for	as	long	as	the	pandemic
continues),	but	there	are	many	in	Italy	who	are	wrong	in	refusing	to	discuss	and	negotiate	conditions,	insisting	on
an	incorrect	solidarity	concept.
If	Italy’s	position	in	demanding	unconditioned	solidarity	is	incorrect,	the	probable	conditions	to	be	put	forth	by	many
in	the	northern	part	of	the	Eurozone	in	case	of	national	debt	restructuring	or	another	form	of	financial	support	for
distressed	countries,	have	problems	of	their	own.	Most	notably,	the	structural	adjustments	which	would	be	likely
included	in	the	conditions	of	any	ESM	activation,	such	as	tax	hikes	and	spending	cuts,	as	already	observed	during
the	Greek	crisis,	will	cause	social	and	economic	pain	as	a	result	of	a	longer	and	deeper	recession,	and	produce
political	side-effects,	such	as	the	further	spread	of	Euroscepticism,	which	are	seldom	taken	into	account,	thus	in	the
end	worsening	the	EU’s	political	crisis.
Moreover,	it	is	questionable	whether	such	structural	reforms	would	actually	deliver	meaningful,	long-lasting	results,
and	allow	a	country	like	Italy	to	return	to	a	path	of	economic	growth	and	financial	sustainability.	Spain	and	Portugal
have	certainly	managed	to	recover	from	the	2008-2009	crash	while	implementing	reforms	which	came	as
conditions	to	access	EU	support,	but	they	did	so	by	massively	expanding	their	national	debt	and	running	high
deficits	for	most	of	the	past	decade	(Spain	from	39.5%	of	GDP	in	2008	to	95.5%	in	2019;	Portugal	from	71.7%	in
2008	to	117.7%	in	2019),	while	Italy,	as	its	debt	already	stood	at	99.8%	of	GDP	in	2008,	was	unable	to	do	the
same.	Moreover,	structural	reforms	are	not	addressing	one	of	the	most	important	economic	issues	in	Italy,	namely
the	now	practically	inevitable	demographic	collapse,	which,	according	to	a	study	by	the	Bank	of	Italy,	will	be	a
formidable	headwind	for	the	country	from	now	onwards,	leading	to	a	scenario	of	permanent	recession.
Both	main	positions	now	shaping	the	intra-EU	debate,	the	one	demanding	unconditional	solidarity	and	the
abandonment	of	most	metrics	of	economic	performance,	as	well	as	the	one	pretending	to	have	the	right	(technical)
solutions	for	Italy’s	and	the	Eurozone’s	problems,	are	wrong.	If	some	kind	of	solution	can	emerge	from	the	current
predicament,	it	should	be	one	starting	from	the	acknowledgment	that	the	dominant	way	to	conceptualise	the
Eurozone’s	governance	has	historically	failed.
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It	has	failed	because	it	was	grounded	on	the	illusion	that	law	(in	the	form	of	international	treaties	initially	envisaged
in	the	late	1980s,	and	thus	in	a	completely	different	economic,	social,	and	demographic	landscape)	can	predict	and
regulate	any	occurrence	in	political	and	economic	life,	indefinitely.	It	has	failed	because	of	excessive	juridification	as
the	most	obvious	degeneration	of	post-war	Ordnungspolitik.
If	such	a	failure	were	to	be	acknowledged,	however,	the	conclusion	may	arise	that	the	only	convenient	path	forward
is	an	orderly	démontage	of	the	currency	bloc.	This	option	is	surely	under	consideration	by	some,	particularly	in	the
North,	even	if	it	implies	huge	political	costs	and	great	uncertainties.	Exceptional	times	favour	exceptional	decisions.
The	Covid-19	pandemic	offers	a	unique	opportunity	for	radical	moves.	If	the	Eurozone	project	is	to	be	abandoned,
now	is	the	time.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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